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SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW
SOMETHING BORROWED, SOMETHING BLUE
J. Mitchell Pickerill*
I. INTRODUCTION
Inherent in the question posed to this symposium is an
inference that there is something unique or different about
the Roberts Court in cases involving business interests.
Much of the commentary on the Roberts Court depicts a scene
in which the Roberts Court is walking down the aisle with big
business. Indeed, commentaries on the first three years of
the Roberts Court from the left and the right claim, with little
equivocation, that the Court has established a friendly arena
for business. Since John Roberts assumed the Chief
Justiceship, the proportion of the docket devoted to business
litigation appears to have increased; outcomes seem more
likely to favor business interests; and the Court seems to be
more consensual in its pro-business decisions, with divisions
seemingly defying the expected conservative-liberal blocs.
If it is true that the Roberts Court is walking down the
aisle with big business, then we must bring something old,
something new, something borrowed, and something blue to
the party. In the first section of this article, we find
something old. I explore the ideological behavior of Justices
Roberts and Alito compared to the justices they replaced,
Rehnquist and O'Connor. All four justices have consistently
voted in the conservative, or pro-business, direction in cases
involving union activity and economic activity, which is
exactly what the predominant model of Supreme Court
decision making in political science-the Attitudinal Model-
would predict. In the next section, I find something new. I
show that despite the ideological similarities among Roberts,
*Associate Professor of Political Science, Washington State University.
1063
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Alito, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, the Roberts Court as a whole
is more likely than previous Courts to reach outcomes that
favor business interests. The Attitudinal Model does not
provide an adequate explanation for this shift, so next I find
our something borrowed by borrowing from a different
literature in political science.
Political Regimes theory, with its roots in the broader
American Political Development and Historical Institutional
literatures, suggests ways in which the Supreme Court
operates as part of a political regime. Here, I explore how
fundamental shifts in economic policy in national politics
were a key feature of the New Right Regime, and Republican
presidents sought to entrench a free market, deregulation
agenda in the judiciary, and in the Supreme Court in
particular. But a key to more fully understanding the long-
term trend on the Court that has culminated in the pro-
business Roberts Court can be found in the concept of
"political time." While Republicans might have been expected
to appoint justices who would support the New Right
Regime's commitments to pro-business policies, what is less
understood is the role Democratic President Bill Clinton
played as a "preemptive president." I explain that as a
preemptive president, Clinton's opportunities to oppose core
values of the dominant lawmaking coalition were limited, and
that much of his success was dependent upon his ability to
neutralize, or preempt, cleavage issues between the parties.
One of the issues Clinton successfully preempted was the
differences between the parties in their approach to the
economy and business. Clinton's appointees to the Court
were therefore moderate to conservative on business and
economic issues, while remaining committed to other core
values of the Democratic Party. By the time President
George W. Bush appointed Roberts and Alito, there was broad
national consensus on approaches to business regulation, and
most of the members of the Court had been influenced by the
law-and-economics movement.
Lastly, I find our something blue and conclude the article
by considering what the effect of the 2008 presidential
election is likely to be for economic policy and the Supreme
Court. As I conclude, much depends on whether President
Barack Obama will be another preemptive president in the
New Right Regime or whether he will be a reconstructive
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president who creates a Blue State Regime.
II. SOMETHING OLD
What makes the Roberts Court the Roberts Court, and
the reason we are examining it as a distinct unit of analysis
in this symposium, is the departure and replacement of two
justices from the Rehnquist Court, including Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Therefore, an assessment of the judicial behavior
on the Roberts Court in cases involving business interests
should begin by asking how we should expect the Roberts
Court to behave in these types of cases relative to earlier
Supreme Courts. That is, if we were to go back to 2005, when
the membership change was pending, what should our
expectations have been? In this section, I examine the
judicial behavior of the newest justices on the Court--John
Roberts and Samuel Alito-compared to the justices they
replaced-William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'Connor-in
decisions affecting business interests. As I will explain,
theoretically we should expect that Roberts and Alito will
vote in a pro-business direction in a manner similar to
Rehnquist and O'Connor because all four have been identified
as having conservative policy preferences. Empirical analysis
comparing the votes of the four in decisions involving union
activity and economic activity seemingly supports the
theoretical expectations derived from the so-called
"Attitudinal Model."
Among political scientists, the dominant theory of
Supreme Court decision making has long been the old
Attitudinal Model. The Attitudinal Model (the "AM") is by
now familiar to, and well understood by, legal academics as
well as political scientists. As the leading proponents of the
AM, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth explain:
This Model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes
in light of the facts of the case vis-A-vis the ideological
attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put,
Rehnquist vote[d] the way he does because he [was]
extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did
because he was extremely liberal.1
The theoretical framework underlying the AM has its
1. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SuPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISTED 86 (2002).
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roots in the legal-realism movement, but also it is formulated
from insights derived from research from political science
behavioralism, psychology, and economics.2 In his book, The
Roosevelt Court, C. Hermann Pritchett analyzed the justices'
votes systematically, providing systematic evidence that the
justices' votes appeared to be "motivated by their own
preferences."3 Although rich with quantitative data and
empirical analysis, Pritchett's work was not particularly
theoretical. In The Judicial Mind, Glendon Schubert began
to scale justices' preferences along ideological and policy
dimensions, developing a theoretical framework for
understanding judicial behavior and measuring judicial
ideology.' There were a number of other important
developments along the way that built on the previous
research by expanding on the theoretical reasons for why we
should expect Supreme Court justices in particular to be free
from constraints on their ability to vote their true policy
preferences. 5 These culminated in the publication of Segal
and Spaeth's The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
in 1993 and The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited in 2002.6
Segal and Spaeth provide a detailed theoretical
explication of their model as well as rigorous empirical tests
of the model. In short, Segal and Spaeth argue that the
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court are free to vote their true
policy preferences-or "attitudes"-because they (a) have life
tenure and a guaranteed compensation and are therefore not
beholden to the other branches of government or public
opinion, (b) are at the top of their profession and are thus not
seeking promotion, and (c) preside in the Court of last resort
that cannot be overturned by a higher court, and that is
unlikely to be overridden through other means, such as
2. See id. at 87-97; see also JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
3. C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947, at xii (1948); see also SEGAL & SPAETH, supra
note 1, at 89.
4. See generally GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE
ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963 (1965).
5. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROIHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING (1976); HAROLD J. SPAETH, AN INTRODUCTION TO SUPREME
COURT DECISION MAKING: REVISED AND ENLARGED EDITION (1972).
6. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2.
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constitutional amendments.7  Therefore, legal rules and
canons of interpretation, such as plain meaning and stare
decisis, do not limit discretion in Supreme Court decision
making. Judicial attitudes are usually conceptualized as
falling along a single conservative-liberal dimension in which,
among other things, conservative judges are more likely to
favor the government in cases involving civil liberties and the
individual or businesses in cases involving economic
regulations; in contrast, liberal justices are more likely to vote
in favor of the individuals and minorities in civil liberties and
civil rights cases and in favor of government regulation in
cases involving economic regulations.
Although there are a number of limitations to the AM,
the empirical analysis of Segal and Spaeth, among many
others, does indeed support the argument that, in general,
the voting behavior of justices can oftentimes be explained by
policy preferences, or something like ideology. Indeed,
commentary about the Roberts Court oftentimes focuses on
the ideological direction of the Court's decisions, and the
Roberts Court has even been dubbed the most conservative
Supreme Court since the New Deal Court.' For the purposes
of this symposium, then, an important first cut at
understanding the relationship between the Roberts Court
and business interests is to examine the direction of the
Roberts Court's decisions affecting business interests and to
assess the power of the AM in these cases.
It is well documented that the judicial appointments by
Richard Nixon began a shift to the right on the Court, and the
appointments made by Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush solidified a conservative majority on the Court.9 The
Rehnquist Court was, on balance, a conservative court. The
Roberts Court is composed of the same justices who served on
the Rehnquist Court since 1994, less Sandra Day O'Connor
and William Rehnquist, who were replaced by John Roberts
and Samuel Alito. O'Connor was considered a moderate
7. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 92-96.
8. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age 3, 54
WAYNE L. REV. 947 (2008).
9. See, e.g., THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004); DONALD
GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1999).
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conservative ideologically and Rehnquist one of the most
conservative members of the Court. Commentary on Roberts
has suggested that he is generally conservative, although his
jurisprudential approach also seems to be marked by
pragmatism and "minimalism," suggesting some moderation
in judicial attitudes. ° On the other hand, when Alito was
nominated, he was typically described as "undeniably a
conservative whose presence on the Supreme Court is likely
to produce more conservative results than we would like to
see" and as "a thoughtful conservative, not a raging
ideologue."" Indeed, one commonly used measurement of the
ideology of the justices among political scientists, the Segal-
Cover Scores, confirms those commentaries. The Segal-Cover
Ideology Scores are based on a scale with a range from 0
(most conservative) to 1 (most liberal). O'Connor's score is a
.415; Rehnquist's score is .045; Roberts's score is .120; and
Alito's score is .100.12 These scores indicate that we would
expect that Rehnquist would be the most conservative justice,
then Alito, followed by Roberts, and lastly O'Connor, who is
considered moderately conservative. In short, we should
expect the Roberts Court to act similarly to the Rehnquist
Court, meaning that it should favor business interests over
government regulation and over labor interests at least as
often as the Rehnquist Court, and perhaps slightly more so.
In order to assess the behavior of the Roberts Court
toward business interests, I analyzed data from the U.S.
Supreme Court Database, compiled by Harold Spaeth (the
"Spaeth Database"). 3 The Spaeth Database codes numerous
10. See Ronald Dworkin, Justice Roberts on Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 20,
2005, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article-id=18330; Jeffrey
Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 104-13; Cass R. Sunstein,
The Minimalist, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at Bll.
11. Editorial, Confirm Samuel Alito, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2006, at B06.
12. For a discussion of how the Segal-Cover Scores are operationalized and
measured, see Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559-61 (1989);
for updated scores, see Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme Court
Nominees, 1937-2005, http://www.sunysb.edu/polscijsegal/qualtable.pdf (last
visited Feb. 1, 2009). See also LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JuDIcIAL APPOINTMENTS 108-13 (2005).
13. The database and supporting documentation are maintained by political
scientist Kirk Randazzo at the University of South Carolina. See The Judicial
Research Initiative, U.S. Supreme Court Databases, http://www.cas.sc.edupolilj
uri/sctdata.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2009).
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variables for every Supreme Court decision from the
beginning of the Warren Court through the last Term of the
Roberts Court. Among the many variables included in the
database are the type of issue involved in the case, the
attitudinal, or ideological, direction of each decision, and the
direction of individual justice's vote in each case. Votes in
favor of business interests are coded as being in the
"conservative" direction, and votes in favor of government
regulation, unions, or labor interests are coded as being in the
"liberal" direction.
I first selected from the Spaeth Database cases that had
been orally argued and decided on the merits involving the
issue areas of union activity and economic activity. 4 Union
activity cases involve arbitration in the context of labor-
management or employer-employees relations, union
antitrust, closed-shop litigation, the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, union
membership disputes, and a host of other labor-management
disputes. The economic activity cases include antitrust,
mergers, bankruptcy, liability, punitive damages, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and a wide range
of other government regulations of the economy and business
activity. Votes in these cases are coded as "conservative" for
votes in favor of business interests and against government
regulation or union authority, and conversely, they are coded
as being in the "liberal" direction for votes in favor of
government regulation of economic activity or union authority
and against the interests of private businesses.
If we want to know what we should expect from the
Roberts Court, and, importantly, whether or how it might
differ from the Rehnquist Court, a logical starting point is to
understand how the behavior of the two newest justices
differs from their predecessors, if at all. 'I examined the
individual votes of Rehnquist, O'Connor, Roberts, and Alito in
these issue areas by computing the total number of votes in
14. In selecting a unit of analysis and decisions types for the analysis in this
article, I followed the advice of Sara Benesh, Becoming an Intelligent User of the
Spaeth Supreme Court Databases, 16 LAW & CTS. (Am. Political Sci. Ass'n,
College Park, Md.), 2006, at 16-19, available at http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/lawco
urts/pubs/newsletter/Winter%202006.pdf (selecting cases for which
"ANALU" = 0 and "DEC_TYPE" = 1, 2, 4, 6, OR 7). For the codebook and
relevant documentation, see The Judicial Research Initiative, supra note 13.
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the conservative and liberal directions for each justice. As
the results in table 1 indicate, all four justices are more likely
to vote in the conservative, or pro-business, direction in these
cases.
Table 1. Direction of Votes by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Roberts, and Alito in Union and Economic Activity Cases
Union Economic Combined
Activity Activity Total
Justice C L C L C L
Rehnquist 87 63 434 323 521 386
(58%) (42%) (57%) (43%) (57%) (43%)
O'Connor 53 35 279 207 332 242
(60%) (40%) (57%) (43%) (58%) (42%)
Roberts 2 1 28 19 30 20
(67%) (33%) (60%) (40%) (60%) (40%)
Alito 2 0 25 17 27 17
(100%) (0.0%) (60%) (41%) (61%) (39%)
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors.
C = Conservative
L = Liberal
Rehnquist and O'Connor each voted in the conservative
direction in most of the decisions involving union activity and
economic activity during their time on the Court. As the far-
right-hand column of table 1 indicates, Rehnquist voted in the
conservative direction in 521 of 907 decisions, or fifty-seven
percent of the time, while O'Connor voted in the conservative
direction in 332 of 574 decisions, or fifty-eight percent of the
time, in cases involving union or economic activity. Given
that the Roberts Court is delineated by the appointment of
Roberts as Chief Justice in September 2005, and that Alito's
nomination was confirmed a few months later in the same
Term in January 2006, Roberts and Alito have voted in far
fewer cases than Rehnquist and O'Connor. Thus, it is
important to be cautious in drawing conclusions from their
votes so far. Nevertheless, such is the sundry business of
evaluating the Roberts Court so early in its existence. While
we must be cautious in making inferences, these data do
constitute the population of cases in these issue areas
through the end of the 2007 Term; thus, we can, at minimum,
draw some conclusions about the first two-and-a-half years of
1070 [Vo1:49
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the Roberts Court. Again, turning to the combined total votes
in union and economic activity cases, we see that Roberts has
voted in the conservative direction in thirty of fifty decisions,
or sixty percent of the time, while Alito has voted in the
conservative direction in twenty-seven of forty-four of these
decisions, or sixty-one percent of the time. In other words,
each has voted in the pro-business direction about sixty
percent of the time compared to Rehnquist and O'Connor,
who voted in the conservative direction just under sixty
percent of the time.
The analysis in this section indicates that all four justices
are, indeed, more likely to vote in a pro-business direction in
cases involving the regulation of economic activity and union
activity. Roberts and Alito voted in the conservative direction
slightly more than the two justices they replaced. These
results are thus consistent with the AM. We have our
Something Old.
III. SOMETHING NEW
The individual voting records appear to confirm that, as
expected, conservative Roberts and Alito are likely to vote in
favor of business interests, perhaps even a little more so than
the two conservative justices they replaced. As I concluded in
the previous section, the fact that Roberts and Alito vote in
the conservative direction in business cases, and that we
should expect the Roberts Court to be more likely to hand
down decisions in favor of-as opposed to against-business
or economic interests, is not breaking news. The Rehnquist
Court evolved into a fairly reliable conservative Court. Pro-
business conservatives Rehnquist and O'Connor were
replaced by Roberts and Alito, whose conservative bona fides
were most certainly part of the criteria upon which President
Bush appointed them. Nonetheless, the Roberts Court's
conservative predisposition does not mean it has been a clone
of the Rehnquist Court. This section will explore some
important ways in which the Roberts Court has deviated from
the behavior of the Rehnquist Court in cases involving or
affecting business interests.
The next step of the inquiry is to ask how has the
membership change on the Court affected outcomes in
business-oriented cases? To these ends, it is necessary to
move from comparing the votes of individual justices on the
1071
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Court to the outcomes of the Court's decisions. I next
examined the outcomes of orally argued decisions for union
and economic activity cases. Table 2 reports the direction of
these decisions for the Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and
Roberts Courts. The results show that the Roberts Court's
decisions have resulted in a higher proportion of pro-business
outcomes. While only twenty-eight percent of the Warren
Court decisions in union activity and economic activity cases
were in the conservative, or pro-business, direction, the
percentage increased in subsequent Courts, to forty-eight
percent during the Burger Court, fifty-four percent in the
Rehnquist Court, and finally, sixty-four percent in the
Roberts Court.
Table 2. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in Union and




Justice C L C L C L
Warren 42 90 131 361 173 451
Court (32%) (68%) (27%) (73%) (28%) (72%)
Burger 54 63 223 239 277 302
Court (46%) (54%) (48%) (52%) (48%) (52%)
Rehnquist 31 22 187 167 218 189
Court (59%) (42%) (53%) (47%) (54%) (46%)
Roberts 2 1 31 18 33 19
Court (67%) (33%) (63%) (37%) (64%) (37%)
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors.
C = Conservative
L = Liberal
Thus, although the evidence in the previous section
indicates that the individual behavior of Justices Roberts and
Alito is only marginally more pro-business than that of their
predecessors, the Roberts Court as a whole appears to be
more likely to vote in the conservative direction than the
Court under the previous three Chief Justices. And therefore,
the explanation for this shift would seem to be more
complicated than simply replacing two conservative justices
on the Court with two new conservative justices.
It has been suggested by contributors to this symposium,
[Vo1:491072
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among others, that the Roberts Court is also accepting more
business cases. 15  Table 3 reports the total number of
Supreme Court decisions and the proportion of those
decisions that were union or economic activity cases by Chief
Justice. Of the Warren Court's 2344 decisions, 132 (six
percent) involved union activity and 492 (twenty-seven
percent) involved economic activity; of the Burger Court's
2912 decisions, 117 (four percent) involved union activity and
462 (sixteen percent) involved economic activity; of the
Rehnquist Court's 2096 decisions, fifty-three (just under three
percent) involved union activity and 354 (seventeen percent)
involved economic activity; and of the Roberts Court's 240
decisions through the end of the 2007 Term, three (one
percent) involved union activity and 492 (a little over twenty
percent) involved economic activity.




Chief Justice (% of total) (% of total)
Warren Court (N = 2344) 132 492
(5.6%) (27%)
Burger Court (N = 2912) 117 462
(4.0%) (15.9%)
Rehnquist Court (N = 2096) 53 354
(2.5%) (16.9%)
Roberts Court (N = 240) 3 49
(1.2%) (20.4%)
Note: unit of analysis = case citation and multiple issues
In addition to these more traditional issue areas
involving business interests before the Court, it has been
noted that the Roberts Court appears to be deciding more
cases in other issue areas that have important implications
for economic policy and big business. 6 One issue area in
which the Roberts Court appears to deviate from the
Rehnquist Court is federalism. The reinvigoration of
doctrines that draw lines between federal and state power
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008,
§ MM (Magazine) at 38.
16. See id.
2009] 1073
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was one of the hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court. 7
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Rehnquist Court handed
down decisions that limited federal power under the
Commerce Clause 8  and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 9 and protected state powers under the Tenth
Amendment" and the Eleventh Amendment.2' The cases
were nearly all decided in five-to-four votes, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas in the majority supporting states' rights and
limited federal power, and Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent.
Whereas the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts behaved
similarly in the labor and economic activity cases analyzed in
the previous section, the Roberts Court appears to be taking a
different tact than the Rehnquist Court in federalism cases.
One indication of a new direction can be seen in the
comparison of votes by Roberts and Alito, and the justices
they replaced, as I reported with union activity and economic
activity cases in the previous section. I selected cases coded
as "federalism cases" in the Spaeth Database, and computed
the number and proportion of votes for federal power. For
these cases, the Spaeth Database codes votes for federal
power as "liberal" and conversely, votes for state power as
"conservative." The results are reported in table 4.
17. See, e.g., Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Guess What
Happened on the Way to the Revolution? Precursors to the Supreme Court's
Federalism Revolution, 34 PUBLIUS 85 (2004) [hereinafter Clayton & Pickerill,
Guess What Happened]; J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The
Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSPS. ON POL.
233 (2004) [hereinafter Pickerill & Clayton, The Rehnquist Court].
18. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Morrison, 529
U.S. 598; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
20. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001);
Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fl.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Seminole Tribe
of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Table 4. Direction of Votes by Justices Rehnquist,












Over the course of their careers, Rehnquist voted for
state authority over federal power fifty-nine percent of the
time, and O'Connor was about evenly split in her votes for
federal and state power. On the other hand, Roberts and
Alito have been much more likely to vote for federal power in
cases pitting federal power against state power-Roberts
voting for federal power seventy-three percent of the time and
Alito voting for the federal government over states eighty-
three percent of the time. Given the small number of votes,
we must be cautious in the conclusions we draw-but again,
that is a problem inherent in analyzing the Roberts Court
after only three years. Still, it is striking that Roberts and
Alito seem to have behaved very similarly to their
predecessors in cases in the union- and economic-activity
categories, but, at least in the first handful of cases in the
area, they have diverged in an area in which conservatives on
the Rehnquist Court had been deemed so successful.
The federalism cases are not direct measures of support
for business interests by the Roberts Court, but the nature of
those cases generally presents a challenge to the federal
government's regulatory authority. As I will explore in the
remainder of this section and in the next, a closer look at
these cases may suggest a new direction for the Court and
confirm that the Roberts Court has found new ways to
support business interests. One subset of the federalism
decisions worth considering in a little more depth are cases
involving federal preemption of state power. These are
instances in which federal and state law regulate the same
activity, and the Court must determine whether there is room
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
for the state and the federal government to regulate the
activity concurrently, or whether the federal law is so
pervasive, or such a conflict exists between the laws, that the
federal law preempts the state from regulating. A number of
commentators have observed that, at least anecdotally, the
Roberts Court appears to be taking the side of federal
regulation over state law in cases with significant
implications for business interests.22 For instance, in Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc.,23 the Court held that a manufacturer of a
medical device that had satisfied federal Food and Drug
Administration standards could not be sued under state tort
law because the federal regulations preempt the state tort
law. The vote was eight-to-one, with Justice Ginsburg
lodging the sole dissent.
Again, using the Spaeth Database, I selected preemption
cases from the federalism cases and compared the outcomes
of those cases during the first three Terms of the Roberts
Court to earlier Courts. The results are reported in table 5.
Table 5. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in
Preemption Cases
Preemption Decisions
Chief Justice Conservative Liberal
Warren Court 17 34
(33%) (67%)
Burger Court 25 29
(46%) (54%)
Rehnquist Court 37 43
(46%) (54%)




22. David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business.Friendly Court? Explaining
the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1019 (2009); Jeffrey Rosen, Keynote Address, Santa Clara Law Review
Symposium: Big Business and the Roberta Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 929
(2009). For specific cases, see, e.g., Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S.
Ct. 989 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561
(2007); United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007); Nat'l Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007); Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
23. See Reigel, 128 S. Ct. 999.
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As table 5 shows, the Warren Court voted for federal
power sixty-seven percent of the time, and state power only
thirty-three percent of the time. The Burger and Rehnquist
Courts shifted a little, each voting for federal power in fifty-
four percent of their preemption decisions, and forty-six
percent in favor of state power. Although the Roberts Court
had only handed down seven preemption decisions by the end
of the 2007 Term, it voted for federal power in six, or eighty-
six percent, of those cases.
The Roberts Court appears to have turned from what is
often characterized as a conservative disposition towards
state authority in federalism cases to supporting the federal
government over the states, especially in cases involving
preemption where the federal regulation would appear to be
more favorable to businesses than the state regulations in
question. It appears that the federalism cases have presented
the Court with competing conservative values-in other
words, conflicts between the values of federalism and
business. But federalism is not the only area in which such a
conflict is presented to the Court, or where we seem to be
witnessing such a divergence, at least anecdotally.
There are also a number of other Roberts Court decisions
that have had implications for big business. For example, as
others in this symposium discuss in more detail, the Roberts
Court has limited punitive damages in lawsuits against big
business under maritime law24 and a mixture of procedural
and substantive due process arguments.25 It has struck down
portions of campaign finance laws that restrict the ability of
corporations, among others such as unions, to sponsor so-
called issue-ads near federal elections.2 6 And it reversed the
white-collar-criminal conviction of Arthur Andersen for its
shredding of documents in the Enron scandal. 7
Based on the analysis of the Roberts Court's decisions in
this section, as well as other contributors to this symposium,
there does seem to be something new afoot regarding the
Court's decisions and big business, or business interests
broadly defined. The Roberts Court is hearing more cases in
the traditional business-related issue areas of union activity
24. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
25. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
26. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
27. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
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and economic activities, and it appears to be deciding a higher
proportion of those cases in the conservative or pro-business
direction. In addition, the Court seems to be deciding more
cases in favor of business interests that involve a range of
legal issues outside traditional union activity and economic
activity issues. The Court's federalism decisions, and
especially those involving preemption, seem to be favoring
federal regulation over state regulation where that result
may have positive consequences for big business. And as
others in this symposium have elucidated, the Court has
favored business punitive damages cases, white-collar crime,
and campaign finance reform, to name a few. We have our
Something New.
What explains this apparent shift? These cases cannot
be explained adequately by the AM. The AM would predict
that the replacement of Rehnquist and O'Connor by Roberts
and Alito would have minimal impact on the Court's agenda
and on the direction of its decisions. Yet there has been a
shift. Most certainly, the explanation is a complex confluence
of factors. As some commentators have noted, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce appears to be more active in its
participation in Supreme Court adjudication.2" And many of
the decisions identified as pro-business decisions involved
cross-cutting issues among those whose ideological
predispositions are viewed as conservative, such as state
autonomy versus tort reform, limiting substantive due
process versus tort reform, or crime control versus business in
white-collar-crime cases. A unidimensional and ahistorical
understanding of ideology is unlikely to provide a very
satisfying explanation for these types of cases involving cross-
cutting issues. In the next section, I suggest that the Court's
apparent pro-business orientation can best be understood at
the aggregate level by borrowing from the insights of a
growing literature on political regimes.
IV. SOMETHING BORROWED
The analysis in the previous two sections, especially
when taken together with the other articles in this
symposium, indicates that the Roberts Court is indeed a pro-
28. See generally Franklin, supra note 22; see also Rosen, supra note 15, at
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business conservative Court. In many respects this should
not be surprising. The Rehnquist Court was a conservative
court, the members of which were mostly appointed by
Republican presidents with pro-business sympathies-but the
increasing number and proportion of pro-business decisions
from the Rehnquist Court to the Roberts Court is somewhat
puzzling. In this section, I argue that the Roberts Court's
decisions are best understood through the lens of a growing
literature, primarily in political science, but also crossing over
to numerous academic lawyers. Borrowing from the
American Political Development ("APD") and Historical
Institutionalism literatures, I argue that the Roberts Court's
pro-business positions are best explained by regime politics
theory and an understanding of the Supreme Court in
political time.
A. Political Regimes, Political Time, and Political Change
Law and courts scholars (primarily from political science,
but increasingly including legal academics) have shown that
elected political elites often support judicial power for many
strategic purposes. Thus, the Court is not simply a counter-
majoritarian institution that thwarts the will of
democratically elected officials.29 Borrowing from the insights
of Robert Dahl from a half-a-century ago, these scholars have
identified ways in which the Court is fundamentally
connected to the elected branches of the federal government,
demonstrating that the role of the Court in the U.S. political
system cannot properly be characterized as counter-
majoritarian.3 ° For example, elected officials might promote
judicial policymaking in order to avoid responsibility for
making controversial policy choices.3 1  They might also use
judicial review as a way to overcome entrenched interests or
29. See generally Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and
the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933 (2001).
30. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). For a
normative defense of a "political Court" that plays an active role in national
policymaking, see generally TERRI JENNINGS PERETI, IN DEFENSE OF A
POLITICAL COURT (1999).
31. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993); see also
GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL
POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 42-67 (2003).
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legislative obstructionists.2 The Court may also manage
divisions or cleavages within an elected official's own political
coalition, such as when Democratic presidents during the
1940s-1960s encouraged the Court to reform American race
relations in cases such as Brown as a way of circumventing
opposition from powerful southern Democrats who controlled
Congress. 3 Finally, elected officials might also want to
empower courts as a way of entrenching policies and
programs that they believe are becoming vulnerable to new or
emerging electoral majorities. 4 And in so doing, as the Court
extends the values of old electoral coalitions, it may bring a
controversial issue to the fore that can evolve into a cleavage
issue among the parties as minority parties attempt to
redefine coalitions for political and electoral gains. For
example, Republicans were able to exploit Court decisions on
abortion and prayer in school to develop the values agenda
and to court evangelicals and other voters who identified with
the Religious Right and conservative social values.3 5
In effect, then, the exercise of judicial power can be
understood in many ways other than as a counter-
majoritarian power. Thus, while the Court might
occasionally act in a manner counter to the policy preferences
32. See generally Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand":
Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States
Supreme Court, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 821 (2005).
33. See generally KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES:
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2004); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN (2004); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
34. See generally Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of
Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court's
Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385 (2006); Clayton & Pickerill,
Guess What Happened, supra note 17, at 85; Pickerill & Clayton, The Rehnquist
Court, supra note 17, at 233. See also Howard Gillman, How Political Parties
Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United
States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 511-24 (2002); KECK, supra note
9; Michael J. Klarman, Mqaoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997). For a comparative perspective, see generally
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
35. See generally J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme
Court and the Political Regime: The New Right Regime and Religious Freedom
(Sept. 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); J. Mitchell
Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The New Right Regime and Privacy Rights,
(April 22, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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of a particular majority, the relationship between the Court
and democratic politics is more nuanced than is often
appreciated or portrayed. Judicial power is just as often
employed as a mechanism for repealing outdated legislation
from previous constitutional periods, for extending the values
of the current political regime to recalcitrant local
jurisdictions, for protecting the policy commitments of a
current majority that are becoming democratically
vulnerable, for managing cross pressures within the
dominant governing coalition, or for many other reasons that
further or advance policy agendas of the dominant political
coalition-but not necessarily as an agent of the majority
coalition. Indeed, scholars adopting this "political regimes"
approach have developed a large body of research that ties
judicial decision making to specific patterns of party politics,
group coalition building, critical elections, the policy agenda
of the governing elites, and other features of the political
36regime.
A political regime is identified as existing during a
discrete historical period in which institutional arrangements
and processes have distinct characteristics and remain
relatively stable during that period. Most notably, the period
is characterized by a dominant electoral coalition associated
with a particular political party, as well as a coherent policy
agenda that can be identified with the dominant coalition and
party. The life of a regime is marked by the construction of a
new regime that replaces an old regime, reaches a zenith, and
then unravels until another new regime replaces it; this
constitutes a temporal process that can be conceptualized as
"political time." At the beginning of a regime, presidents and
other political leaders define and articulate the major values
of the regime, which are, in effect, the values and policy
preferences of the electoral coalition that brought the new
leader to office. In so doing, they also construct new
constitutional and legal meanings for legitimating their
values and preferences. The Supreme Court may eventually
be expected to exercise power in ways that advance and
36. For an overview of "political regimes" or "political construction"
literature, see generally Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 425 (2005). See also Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of
Partisan Coalitions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 644
(Keith E. Whittingon, R., Daniel Keleman & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008).
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extend these values-but not necessarily as an agent of the
majority. Rather, legal interpretation often has its roots in
antecedent political construction of law, although it is also the
case that political change may occur in response to
controversial judicial decisions, particularly during the
decline of an existing regime. 7
Although a political regime is characterized by stability
in institutional arrangements and political order, the life of
the regime is not a static one; rather, regimes are dynamic
and fluid, and political regimes can emerge and decline in
various ways. Political change is often the result of a process
that Carmines and Stimson label "issue evolution.
38
According to issue evolution theory, changes in the political
system are rarely created by the sharp, tectonic-style shifts
posited by realignment and related theories. Change occurs
in a more gradual fashion through "dynamic evolution of new
issues" and "the continuous replacement of the electorate"
around one or more issue cleavages 9.3  As theorized by
Carmines and Stimson, the process of issue evolution is a
four-stage process: (1) political elites clarify and frame an
issue in partisan terms, often for strategic electoral purposes;
(2) taking cues from elite partisan actors, the mass public
alters its perceptions of the parties with respect to the new
issue dimension; (3) the issue evokes a strong emotional or
affective reaction on the part of voters that destabilizes the
inertia of existing partisan identifications; and (4) mass
partisan realignment transpires. °
The historical course of a regime and political change can
be characterized by what political scientist Stephen
Skowronek labels as "political time": a cycle during which
political institutions and actors find themselves in different
inter-relationships in the regime, and with varying
opportunities, levels of power, and constraints or limitations
on that power.41 For example, Skowronek has identified four
types of Presidents in political time: reconstructive presidents,
37. See generally Graber, supra note 36.
38. EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 159 (1989).
39. Id. at 158.
40. Id. at 160-61.
41. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 29-32 (1997).
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articulation presidents, preemptive presidents, and disjunctive
presidents. Reconstructive presidents stand in opposition to
the agenda and values of a declining regime, and they possess
greater opportunities to articulate and reconstitute the
political order (Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham
Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan).
Articulation presidents are from the same party as the
dominant party of the regime and are committed to regime
values at a time when the regime remains dominant. They
may have opportunities to become "orthodox innovators" as
they attempt to extend and expand on current regime values
(e.g., James Madison, Theodore Roosevelt, Harry Truman,
Lyndon Johnson, and George H.W. Bush). Preemptive
presidents are opposed to the dominant political party,
agenda, and values at a time when the regime remains
strong. They are therefore constrained in their abilities to
effect change. They will often find themselves having to find
ways to neutralize key cleavage issues between their party
and the dominant party, and much of their success may be
defined by their ability to moderate the more extreme policies
and stances in the existing regime (e.g., Grover Cleveland,
Woodrow Wilson, Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, and
Bill Clinton). Lastly, disjunctive presidents hold office during
the twilight of a declining regime. They are usually blamed
for political, economic, or social problems as the once-
dominant coalition is falling apart, and they provide an easy
target for reconstructive presidents as they build a new
dominant electoral coalition, shatter the old regime, and
reconstitute the regime (e.g., John Adams, John Quincy
Adams, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Herbert Hoover,
and Jimmy Carter).
Presidents are not the only political institutions or actors
whose authority is defined in some part by regime politics
and political time. As Keith Whittington claims, "The Court
does not exist outside of political time, but rather both helps
determine political time and occupies a position within it."42
Reconstructive presidents will oftentimes face a hostile Court,
which has been constituted by the appointment process in the
42. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 75 (2007).
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previous regime, and thus is committed to the agenda and
values of the previous regime. In time, reconstructive
presidents will successfully transform the Court through
appointments or other mechanisms and reorient it to support
new regime values. As Whittington acknowledges, "The
politics of Reconstruction hinges on the ability of the
president to bolster his authority to define the new regime
and to wrest control over the definition of the constitutional
order from other political actors, including the judiciary."43
The Court may even "be used as a foil to enhance the
president's own authority," in part because "[p]olitically
isolated, judges make a particularly good representative of
the old, discredited commitments and entrenched interests."
4
On the other hand, preemptive presidents find themselves in
a very different position relative to the Court. Preemptive
presidents are not usually "in a position to launch the
reconstructive project. Preemptive presidents will instead
have to pick their shots."45 These presidents will often be
"reformers within their own party" who are finding ways to
neutralize cleavage issues that have hurt their party's
electoral bids "by blurring party distinctions and offering
themselves up as a moderate administrator of the consensus
ideology .... ,,46 These presidents will therefore not be in a
very strong position to challenge the Court, but may find
ways to support the Court in the name of consensus or
moderation. The stability and relative independence of the
judiciary will likely make it a more consistent, less partisan,
and perhaps even friendlier institution for the preemptive
president than Congress, at least one house of which is likely
to be dominated by partisans committed to the dominant
regime values. That is, the Court may reflect the core values
of the regime over time, but it is not a "mere instrument" of
the regime-a characteristic that can be useful to preemptive
presidents, especially in periods of divided government.47
B. The New Right Regime, Economic Policy, and Big Business
As Cornell Clayton and I, among others, have described
43. Id. at 76.
44. Id. at 77.
45. Id. at 161.
46. Id. at 162.
47. Id. at 169-70.
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elsewhere, the New Right Regime emerged over a period of
time beginning in the late 1960s, solidifying itself with the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.48 A full review of the rise
of the New Right Regime is beyond the scope of this article.
But in short, it is a familiar story that as the New Deal
coalition of northern and southern Democrats became
increasingly fragmented, especially over civil rights in the
1960s, "political entrepreneurs" in the Republican Party
capitalized on that fragmentation and seized on issues
intended to bring portions of that coalition, especially more
conservative southern Democrats, into a new Republican
Party. Beginning with Richard Nixon's "southern strategy,"
and culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan,
Republicans were able to exploit the fissures in the
Democratic Party, begin defining several emerging cleavage
issues, sharpen the differences between themselves and the
Democrats, and court the voters who eventually became
known as "Reagan Democrats." Reagan was elected and is
viewed as a reconstructive president-replacing many of the
values and commitments of the New Deal Regime with more
conservative values and commitments.
In this section, I review how one of the key regime values
articulated by Reagan was a pro-business agenda that
included deregulation, tax relief, and supply-side economics.
As a reconstructive president, Reagan opposed the
redistributive, pro-regulation, Keynesian-based economic
policies of the New Deal-Great Society regime. Reagan
sought to replace what he and other Republicans labeled an
anti-business agenda with a more pro-business, free market
one. Although opposed by Democrats in the 1980s, by the
time Bill Clinton was elected to the presidency, Democratic
elites' views on economic regulation and business had shifted
to a more moderate and consensus position; it was a key issue
that had been a cleavage issue between Democrats and
Republicans and which Clinton-a preemptive president-
managed to neutralize.
The economic woes of the 1970s played a central role in
Ronald Reagan's ascension to the presidency. The United
48. See Clayton & Pickerill, Guess What Happened, supra note 17, at 94-
102; Pickerill & Clayton, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 17, at 237-38;
Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 34, at 1386-87.
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States was plagued by high unemployment, high inflation,
and low economic growth. Reagan was successful in blaming
the country's economic problems on the economic policies of
then-President Jimmy Carter and the Democratic Party.
Since the New Deal, Democrats' approach to economic policy
had been rooted in Keynesian economics and espoused a
positive "role for government regulation in managing the
economy and redistributing incomes [to take] the hard edge
off laissez-faire capitalism."49 Early in his campaign, Reagan
campaign officials had consulted libertarian economists like
Milton Friedman, making economic policy a key campaign
issue and formulating a new economic policy that would
address international financial problems and take the
country in a new direction.5" As observers of the 1980
campaign have noted, Reagan took office pledging to "restore
prosperity to American business."51 Presidential election
scholar Stephen Wayne notes how Reagan emphasized the
poor economy and the need for a new economic policy:
"Ronald Reagan drove the economic problem home in 1980
with the question he posed at the end of his debate with
Jimmy Carter, a question directed at the American people:
'Are you better off now than you were four years ago?' "52
Reagan's campaign pledges to a free market, pro-business
economic policy are exemplified in these excerpts from the
1980 Republican Party platform:
Elsewhere in this platform we discuss the benefits, for
society as a whole, of reduced taxation, particularly in
terms of economic growth. But we believe it is essential to
cut personal tax rates out of fairness to the individual.
Presently, the aggregate burden of taxation is so great
that the average American spends a substantial part of
every year, in effect, working for government.
Tax rate reductions will generate increases in
economic growth, output, and income which will
49. Isabel V. Sawhill, Reaganomics in Retrospect, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
REAGAN YEARS 91, 91 (John L. Palmer ed., 1986).
50. Kirk Victor, The Braintrusters, NAT'L J., Feb. 13, 1988, at 394-95.
51. Perry D. Quick, Business: Reagan's Industrial Policy, in THE REAGAN
RECORD 287, 287 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1984).
52. STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 1996: THE
POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 216 (1997).
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ultimately generate increased revenues. The greater
justification for these cuts, however, lies in the right of
individuals to keep and use the money they earn.
... First and foremost, we are committed to a policy of
economic expansion through tax-rate reductions, spending
restraint, regulatory reform, and other incentives.
53
Although Reagan won in a landslide, the economy
remained an important cleavage issue between the two major
parties. In the 1984 presidential election, Democratic
nominee Walter Mondale opposed what had become known as
"Reaganomics" and indicated that if elected, he would raise
taxes as a means of deficit reduction; Reagan countered by
opposing tax increases but supporting "tax simplification." 4
The 1984 Democrats continued to adhere to a policy agenda
involving a more activist government in the regulation of the
economy in the tradition of the New Deal and Great Society,
as evidenced in their national platform that year:
For the economy, the Democratic Party is committed
to economic growth, prosperity, and jobs. For the
individual, we are committed to justice, decency, and
opportunity....
In the future we propose, young families will be able
to buy and keep new homes-instead of fearing the
explosion of their adjustable-rate mortgages. Workers will
feel secure in their jobs-instead of fearing layoffs and
lower wages. Seniors will look forward to retirement-
instead of fearing it. Farmers will get a decent return on
their investment-instead of fearing bankruptcy and
foreclosure.
We believe in the inspiration of American dreams, and
the power of progressive ideals. We believe in the dignity
of the individual and the enormous potential of collective
action. We believe in building, not wrecking. We believe
in bridging our differences, not deepening them. We
53. Platform for the Republican Party, 1980 (July 15, 1980),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844.
54. See Henry A. Plotkin, Issues in the Campaign, in THE ELECTION OF
1984: REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 35, 44 (Marlene Michaels Pomper ed.,
1985).
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believe in a fair society for working Americans of average
income; an opportunity society for enterprising Americans;
a caring society for Americans in need through no fault of
their own-the sick, the disabled, the hungry, the elderly,
the unemployed; and a safe, decent and prosperous society
for all Americans.
We have a proud legacy to build upon: the Democratic
tradition of caring, and the Democratic commitment to an
activist government that understands and accepts its
responsibilities.
55
Mondale's willingness to raise taxes was likely a
contributing factor in the Reagan landslide victory that
year.5 6 And in any event, Reagan and the Republican Party
successfully exploited the differences in economic and tax
policy between themselves and Mondale and the Democrats."
In 1992, Bill Clinton ran as a "New Democrat." Within
the campaign, "it's the economy, stupid" became a mantra.
Clinton attempted to neutralize several key cleavage issues
that seemed to plague the Democrats' presidential candidates
in three successive presidential elections. One of those was
the perception that Democrats were for "big government" and
were anti-business. As the 1992 Democratic Platform made
clear, Clinton and his Democratic supporters argued that
they did not want to return to pre-Reagan regulatory policies,
but that there was a "third way" of approaching economic
policy, one that moderated the extremes:
The Revolution of 1992 is about restoring America's
economic greatness. We need to rebuild America by
abandoning the something-for-nothing ethic of the last
decade and putting people first for a change. Only a
thriving economy, a strong manufacturing base, and
growth in creative new enterprise can generate the
resources to meet the nation's pressing human and social
needs. An expanding, entrepreneurial economy of high-
skill, high-wage jobs is the most important family policy,
55. Platform for the Democratic Party, 1984 (July 16, 1984),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29608.
56. See, e.g., NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDASKY, PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 97-98 (9th
ed. 1996); Gerald M. Pomper, The Presidential Election, in THE ELECTION OF
1984: REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 54, at 74.
57. See Pomper, supra note 56, at 74.
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urban policy, labor policy, minority policy and foreign
policy America can have.
Our Party's first priority is opportunity-broad-based,
non-inflationary economic growth and the opportunity
that flows from it. Democrats in 1992 hold nothing more
important for America than an economy that offers growth
and jobs for all.
We reject both the do-nothing government of the last
twelve years and the big government theory that says we
can hamstring business and tax and spend our way to
prosperity. Instead we offer a third way. Just as we have
always viewed working men and women as the bedrock of
our economy, we honor business as a noble endeavor, and
vow to create a far better climate for firms and
independent contractors of all sizes that empower their
workers, revolutionize their workplaces, respect the
environment, and serve their communities well.
We believe in free enterprise and the power of market
forces. But economic growth will not come without a
national economic strategy to invest in people. For twelve
years our country has had no economic vision, leadership
or strategy. It is time to put our people and our country
first.5
8
Thus, in 1992, Clinton set out to neutralize what had
been a losing issue for the Democrats.59  That he was
successful in doing do is evidenced by the results of Gallup
Polls that asked Americans which party they thought would
best handle the economy: in 1980, thirty-five percent
responded that the Republicans would best handle the
economy, and thirty-six percent that the Democrats would be
the best custodians of the economy; in 1984, forty-eight
percent responded that the Republicans would best handle
the economy, and thirty-six percent that the Democrats would
be the best custodians of the economy; in 1988, fifty-two
58. Platform for the Democratic Party, 1992 (July 13, 1992),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29610.
59. As others have noted, Clinton was helped by the fact that the country
experienced a slowing economy and at least a mild recession during the last
year of George H.W. Bush's presidency. See, e.g., WAYNE, supra note 52, at 217.
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percent responded that the Republicans would best handle
the economy, and thirty-four percent that the Democrats
would be the best custodians of the economy; however by
1992, the trend had reversed, and only thirty-six percent
responded that the Republicans would best handle the
economy compared to forty-five percent who responded that
the Democrats would be the best custodians of the economy.6 °
Once in office, the Clinton administration developed an
economic policy that centered on deficit reduction and free
trade.61 In the first year, his economic plan was enacted,
after Vice President Al Gore cast a tie-breaking vote for the
plan in the Senate, on August 6, 1993.62 And although he
risked alienating organized labor and being seen as
abandoning traditional Democratic commitments, Clinton
chose to support the bipartisan passage of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), reportedly
telling staff, "I have to be a President beyond borders. '63 In
assessing Clinton's legacy, Peter Baker wrote in the
Washington Post just last year:
As a New Democrat, he aimed to govern more from the
center, declaring that "the era of big government is over,"
pushing a deficit-reduction package through Congress by a
single vote, winning approval of the North American Free
Trade Agreement and overhauling the welfare system. He
presided over the longest peacetime economic expansion in
American history to date.6
4
Undoubtedly, tWo of the most significant accomplishments of
Clinton's presidency were deficit reduction and the promotion
of free trade." Clearly, Clinton had been successful in
60. NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDASKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS:
STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 149 (11th ed. 2004).
61. The third prong of the Clinton economic agenda was based on Robert
Reich's theory of human capital and the need for substantial amounts of
government "investment" in policies such as job training. BOB WOODWARD, THE
AGENDA: INSIDE THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE 95-162 (1995). As Woodward
points out, however, while there was some additional investment in
infrastructure in Clinton's economic policies, the emphasis would become deficit
reduction and free trade. Id.
62. See id. at 356-67 (describing the passage of the plan).
63. Id. at 374.
64. Peter Baker, Bill Clinton's Legacy: How Former President is Viewed
Could Affect Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2008, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/20080203/ST200802030
0011.html.
65. See generally ALEX WADDEN, CLINTON'S LEGACY?: A NEW DEMOCRAT IN
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preempting these economic issues as significant cleavage
issues between the parties.
C. The Supreme Court, the New Right Regime, and Economic
Policy
Scholars have chronicled the rise of conservatism as a
political force influencing the direction of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. The key mechanism for doing so has
involved judicial appointments. As far as the Supreme Court
is concerned, then, we would expect Reagan-Bush judicial
appointees to support, at a general level, the commitments
and policies of the New Right Regime. Reagan, as a
reconstructive president, had replaced the old regime values
with new ones. Moreover, he made appointments to the
Supreme Court designed to entrench those values. Indeed, it
is well documented that Reagan and his legal advisors, such
as Attorneys General William French Smith and Edwin
Meese III, and other members of the administration to whom
Reagan delegated great authority over judicial appointments,
"had a more coherent and ambitious agenda for legal reform
and judicial selection than any previous administration."66
The Reagan team's strategy was clear; as David O'Brien
claims, "Indisputably, Reagan's Justice Department
systematically and effectively infused its legal policy goals
into the judicial selection process."67  They did so by
implementing a rigorous and organized screening process
that involved interviews and in-depth background
investigations to assure that potential nominees were
ideologically in tune with the New Right agenda.68 The
appointment of conservative judges was greatly facilitated by
"the rise of the conservative legal movement," which involved
the promotion of conservative legal values through various
GOVERNANCE (2002). For a broader range of perspectives on the Clinton legacy,
see generally THE CLINTON LEGACY (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds.,
2000).
66. David M. O'Brien, The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring Legacy?, in
THE REAGAN LEGACY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 60, 62 (Charles 0. Jones
ed., 1988).
67. Id. at 67.
68. Id. at 67-71; DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES:
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
133-35 (1999); Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term
Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313, 315 (1985).
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conservative foundations, think tanks, and related groups,
such as the Olin Foundation, the Federalist Society, the Law
and Economics Center, the Center for Individual Rights, and
the Institute for Justice.69
Reagan's appointments were successful in the sense that
the federal courts gradually became more conservative and
supported the conservative legal agenda. Reagan's judicial
appointments have been deemed his "best legacy.""0 As the
New Right gradually consolidated its control over the elected
branches of the national government and appointed more
federal judges-and Supreme Court justices more
specifically-it extended its control over the Supreme Court
and significantly altered many areas of law. In federalism,
for example, the Rehnquist Court reasserted the idea of state
sovereignty under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments and,
for the first time since the establishment of the New Deal
Regime in the 1930s, restricted congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7' Similarly, in the areas of criminal justice and
criminal procedure, the post-1968 Court has narrowed the
applicability of the Court's Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v.
Ohio precedents, limited the exclusionary rule more
generally, and consistently upheld the constitutionality of the
death penalty.72 Indeed, the changes to law and legal
doctrines made by the Court reflected closely the political
views and electoral positions articulated by the Republican
Party after 1964 at both the general level and in many
particulars.7 3
In each of these instances, the Republican Party pursued
an explicit strategy aimed at implementing and entrenching
core New Right policy goals by altering the Court's
jurisprudence. While the Rehnquist Court's federalism
revival reflected New Right antipathy for the New Deal
regulatory state and a normative commitment to limiting
federal power, the Court's criminal justice decisions reflected
69. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008).
70. O'Brien, supra note 66, at 60.
71. See Clayton & Pickerill, Guess What Happened, supra note 17, at 85-86;
Pickerill & Clayton, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 17, at 240-41.
72. See Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 34, at 1416-17.
73. Id. at 1411-18.
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the New Right's antipathy toward the liberal corrective idea
of rehabilitation and its preference for policies emphasizing
retributive punishment and strengthened law enforcement
authority. The Reagan legal and judicial strategy was most
overtly aimed at liberal activism in the Warren and early
Burger Courts, and the salient social issues that arose
associated with some of the more controversial Supreme
Court decisions, such as prayer in public schools, abortion,
pornography, and crime.74
Part of Reagan's legal policy agenda, however, also
included an economics and pro-business component. As
Steven Teles chronicles in his definitive work on the
conservative legal movement, the "first conservative public
interest law firm, the Pacific Legal Foundation" was founded
in 1973 in California-while Reagan was Governor-in an
effort to counter liberal public interest law firms ("PILFs").75
According to Teles, "Conservatives in government, especially
Ronald Reagan during his stint as governor from 1967-1975,
found their agenda obstructed by liberal PILFs .... ."' Teles
carefully explains how the law-and-economics movement then
emerged as an approach to law in which the primary objective
of law is economic efficiency, and how the approach migrated
into elite law schools such as the University of Chicago, Yale
University, Harvard University, and beyond.77 It is not
surprising, then, that Reagan's judicial appointments would
bring with them to the Court a law-and-economics, pro-
business outlook on the law. Nor should it be surprising that
subsequent Republican presidents would, as articulation
presidents, also appoint justices with the same sort of
commitment.
On the other hand, it might have been assumed that a
Democratic president would appoint judges-and Supreme
Court justices specifically-who would be friendly toward
government regulation of business and oppose the Reagan
economic agenda. But recall that Clinton was a preemptive
president who quite consciously moderated the positions of
his party in order to neutralize or preempt important
cleavage issues that had disadvantaged Democrats at the
74. YALOF, supra note 68, at 133.
75. TELES, supra note 69, at 61.
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id. at 181-216.
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polls in three previous national elections. When Clinton's
first opportunity arose to appoint a Supreme Court justice by
nominating a successor to Justice Byron White in 1993,
Clinton is said to have wanted to hit a "home run," and was
interested in nominating former New York Governor Mario
Cuomo. 78  However, Cuomo publicly withdrew his name.79
According to White House adviser George Stephanopoulos,
Clinton described the characteristics he was looking for in a
Supreme Court nominee: "fine mind, good judgment, wide
experience in the law and in the problems of real people, and
someone with a big heart." 0 While Clinton had hoped to find
a nominee with some political experience, like Cuomo or
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, Clinton chose to avoid
"engaging in another messy confirmation struggle with
Republicans," especially in the wake of his failed nomination
of Lani Guinier to the Department of Justice."1 Clinton
eventually selected Ruth Bader Ginsburg to replace Justice
White, and a year later, Stephen Breyer to replace Justice
Harry Blackmun. Both of these selections were considered
"safe" in the sense that they were viewed as judicial
moderates, and both were acceptable to Orrin Hatch (R-UT),
the ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 2
According to Michael Gerhardt, Clinton decided not to pursue
nominees on ideological grounds, but instead "on the grounds
of their appeal to certain constituencies, age and health, and
likelihood for confirmation." 3
Although Ginsburg supported some core values of the
Democratic Party, such as abortion rights, freedom of speech,
and efforts to fight sex discrimination, she had "acquired a
reputation as a cautious centrist on an appellate court with
deep ideological divisions."' And she had attended a law-
and-economics conference put on for federal judges by
78. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME
COURT CONFIRMATIONS 114-15 (2007).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 114; GEORGE STEPHANOPOLOUS, ALL TOO HUMAN: A POLITICAL
EDUCATION 167 (1999).
81. YALOF, supra note 68, at 199.
82. Id.
83. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 76 (2000); see also YALOF, supra
note 68, at 196-205.
84. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 78, at 117.
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conservative foundations. 5 As Silverstein observes, "The
moderating impact of her years on the federal bench, her
gender, her religion (she would be the first Jewish justice
since Abe Fortas) made her, in the words of Republican
Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, a 'Democrat even
Republicans can support.' "86 Indeed, Jeffrey Rosen would
come to refer to Ginsburg as the "avatar, in most cases, of
judicial minimalism" and "the antithesis of William Brennan,
the liberal lion of the Warren Court."7
Breyer, too, was seen as a centrist. According to Michael
Comiskey,
Although his views on some issues were unknown, he was
widely described by his acquaintances and the many
members of the legal community familiar with his work as
pro-choice (as he acknowledged at his confirmation
hearings), skeptical toward business regulation (the
subject of his four books), moderate to conservative on
crime... and a defender of the use of legislative history to
interpret statutes.88
He was also well known to members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee because he had served as chief counsel to the
committee, and in particular, Senators Ted Kennedy (D-MA)
and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) supported him. 9 In addition to the
conventional wisdom espoused that Ginsburg and Breyer
were moderate or centrist judges, the Segal-Cover Scores of
perceived ideology (discussed earlier) supports the
assessment and places both in the middle of the ideological
scale. 90
Both of Clinton's nominees were easily confirmed. But as
Silverstein notes, "The ease with which both Ginsburg and
Breyer gained Senate approval must not obscure the degree
to which their appointments were the product of political
conflict and weakness."9' 1 Indeed, Clinton's appointments to
the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
85. TELES, supra note 69, at 113.
86. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 78, at 118 (citation omitted).
87. Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1997, § 6 (Magazine) at 60.
88. MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME
COURT NOMINEES 143 (2004).
89. Id.; see also YALOF, supra note 68, at 198.
90. See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 12, at 110.
91. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 78, at 121.
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Breyer, reflected his more moderate position on the issues he
had worked to preempt and avoided difficult partisan fights.
And thus, by the time John Roberts was appointed to replace
Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005, issues involving business
and economic regulation were not significant cleavage issues
in national politics. The Court could comfortably follow a
law-and-economics approach to legal interpretation that was
consistent with consensual political values.
In order to examine further the record of the Court in
business-related cases, and the effects of Clinton's preemptive
presidency on the Court, I computed the outcomes of the
Court decisions involving union activity and economic activity
across periods not determined by who was Chief Justice, but
rather by key points in political time. Because I am
interested in the evolution of the pro-business issue across
the New Right Regime and the impact of the appointments
during Clinton's preemptive presidency, I analyzed outcomes
during periods beginning with the first Supreme Court
appointment of Dwight Eisenhower (Earl Warren in 1953),
Richard Nixon (Warren Burger in 1969), Ronald Reagan
(Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981), Bill Clinton (Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in 1993), and George W. Bush (John Roberts in
2005). Each period-until the appointment of John Roberts
in 2005-spans roughly the same amount of time: twelve or
thirteen years.
Table 6. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in Union and
Economic Activity Cases in Political Time
Union Economic Combined
President Activity Activity Total
(First






















23 21 65 87 88 108
(52%) (47%) (43%) (57%) (45%) (55%)
51 55 241 232 292 287
(48%) (52%) (51%) (49%) (50%) (50%)
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Table 6. Direction of Supreme Court Outcomes in Union and
Economic Activity Cases in Political Time (continued)
Union Economic Combined
President Activity Activity Total
(First
Appoint.) C L C L C L
Clinton 11 9 104 87 115 96
1993 (55%) (45%) (55%) (46%) (55%) (46%)
(Ginsburg)
Bush 2 1 31 18 33 19
2005 (67%) (33%) (63%) (37%) (64%) (37%)
(Roberts)
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding errors.
C = Conservative
L = Liberal
As table 6 shows, the trend in the Court's pro-business
orientation began with President Nixon's appointments.
While the Court decided seventy-two percent of union and
economic cases in a liberal (pro-union or pro-government
regulation) direction from Eisenhower's appointment of
Warren in 1953 until Nixon's appointment of Burger in 1969,
it decided only fifty-five percent in the liberal direction from
the appointment of Burger until Reagan's appointment of
O'Connor in 1981. After 1981, the Court shifted to the right
in these cases, and between 1981 and Clinton's appointment
of Ginsburg, the Court was evenly split, deciding fifty percent
in the liberal direction and fifty percent conservative (or pro-
business) direction. From 1993 until Bush's appointment of
John Roberts in 2005, the Court continued the trend and
decided an even higher proportion-fifty-five percent--of
these cases in the conservative direction. And as we saw
earlier, in the short time since Roberts was appointed, the
Court has become even more conservative in these cases,
deciding sixty-four percent in the conservative direction.
Although it may be tempting by some to attribute the
evolution of a pro-business Supreme Court solely to
conservative justices appointed by Republican presidents, the
evidence suggests that would probably be an
oversimplification. An underlying cause of the shift has been
attributed to the nature of regime politics, taking into account
the role of preemptive presidents in political time. How a
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preemptive president influences issue evolution on the Court
will depend on the issues that those presidents choose to
preempt and which they choose exploit, as well as the
strength of the existing regime. Clinton's choice to preempt
the past divisions between Republicans and Democrats over
economic policy, and a relatively weak political position, led
to moderate justices who remain committed to core values of
the Democratic Party that Clinton did not preempt, but who
hold more moderate, or even conservative, views on economic
and business-related issues.
By elaborating on the connection between regime politics,
political time, and the evolution of commitments in the broad
area of economic policy and business regulation, I do not
mean to suggest that no other factors were at work here. As
Teles has shown quite persuasively, the conservative legal
movement mobilized successfully and had a significant
influence in bringing law-and-economics approaches to law
students, scholars, practitioners, and judges. 2 Indeed, Rosen
and others in this symposium have argued that the role of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been important in bringing
more business cases before the Court and in the pro-business
outcomes on the Court." Moreover, it has been suggested
that one of Roberts's goals in assuming the Chief Justiceship
was to try to reach more consensual decisions for the sake of
legal stability and institutional legitimacy, and to avoid
fragmented controversial decisions.94 It may be that business
cases, especially statutory interpretation cases, involve less
salient, more narrow, and technical legal issues that evoke
less ideological passion and result in more consensus on the
Court. Moreover, in the area of statutory construction, a
larger proportion of the statutes or statutory provisions being
interpreted by the Court today are likely to have been passed
or amended by Congress during the New Right Regime by
Republicans, usually during periods with a Republican
president or a Republican Congress, or both. Hence, those
92. See generally TELES, supra note 69.
93. Jeffrey Rosen, Professor of Law at George Washington Univ., Legal
Affairs Editor of the New Republic, Keynote Address at Santa Clara Law
Review Symposium: Big Business and the Roberts Court (Jan. 23, 2009); Brian
Wolfman, Dir., Pub. Citizen Litig. Group, Address at Santa Clara Law Review
Symposium: Big Business and the Roberts Court (Jan. 23, 2009).
94. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND
RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 7-8 (2006); Rosen, supra note 10, at 105-13.
1098 [Vo1:49
2009] SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW
provisions may well have been intended to be applied in a
manner that might be considered business friendly.
While it is most certainly true that some or all of these
additional factors have probably contributed in some way to
the increasingly pro-business orientation of the Roberts
Court, the Court's pro-business decisions are best understood
as the culmination of a long issue evolution during the New
Right Regime. Importantly, the evolution was facilitated by a
Democratic president, who-because he was a preemptive
president-chose to neutralize cleavages between the parties
over economic policy. We have our Something Borrowed.
V. SOMETHING BLUE
If, indeed, Democratic President Bill Clinton facilitated
the evolution of the New Right's economic policies, it is
appropriate to conclude this inquiry by asking: what should
we expect after the 2008 presidential election? There has
been speculation about the possibility that President Barack
Obama could have as many as three vacancies on the Court to
fill in his first term alone.95 What should we expect from
Obama then? Should we expect Clinton-like appointments
who are similar to Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and who act
moderately conservative in business cases, but who still
support abortion rights, affirmative action, and civil rights; a
decidedly liberal, pro-regulatory activist; or a new type of
non-conservative? It is obviously too early to predict with
much confidence, but the answer would seem to hinge on
where we are in political time and what type of president
Obama will be. On the one hand, Obama could turn out to be
another preemptive president in the New Right Regime. On
the other hand, perhaps he will turn out to be a
reconstructive president who will bring about a new Blue
State Regime.
There are certainly indications that Obama could be a
reconstructive president. President George W. Bush left
office with the lowest public approval ratings of any president
95. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, The Court and the 2008 Election,
SCOTUSBLOG, May 18, 2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/
2007/05/analysis-thesco.3.html.
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in the history of approval ratings. 6 The Republicans lost big
in the 2006 congressional elections, and the Democrats
gained control of both houses of Congress for the first time
since 1994. Clayton and Christensen observe that "Barack
Obama's election in 2008 came with victories in states the
Democrats had not carried in forty years and significantly
expanded majorities in both houses of Congress."97 And
therefore, "[i]f Bush is a disjunctive president, then Obama
comes into office, with an opportunity at least, to become a
reconstructive one.98  If Obama were to seize that
opportunity, we would expect a bold policy agenda that
breaks with the commitments of the New Right Regime in
fundamental ways. And if the new president does so, we
would expect his nominees to the Court to reflect new
commitments made by President Obama. Obama's stated
reasons for voting against the nominations of Justices
Roberts and Alito while in the Senate might suggest the types
of values that would guide the commitments and agenda in a
Blue State Regime; in each instance, Obama acknowledged
the nominee's qualifications, but stated that he would vote
against them because they had records of supporting the
"strong over the weak" and the "powerful against the
powerless."99 Moreover, Obama has stated that Earl Warren
might serve as a model for his ideal justice. 00  These
statements suggest that Obama might indeed pursue a
transformative agenda, and he might try to appoint justices
who support redistributive economic policies and more
extensive regulations of corporations and business activities.
On the other hand, it is not a foregone conclusion that
Bush was indeed a disjunctive president. Skowronek has
labeled him an articulation president who has engaged in
96. Paul Steinhauser, Belief the Country is Heading in the Right Direction
at an All Time Low, CNN.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITI
CS/11/10/bush.transition.poll.
97. Cornell W. Clayton & Ericka Christensen, Whither the Roberts Court?,
6 THE FORUM: ARTICLE 10, 21 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/foru
m/vol6/iss4/artl0.
98. Id.
99. For Obama's speech opposing John Roberts in 2005, see 151 CONG. REC.
S10365-66 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama). For his speech opposing Samuel
Alito in 2006, see 152 CONG. REC. S190 (2006) (statement of Sen. Obama).
100. See Michael Powell, Strong Words in Ohio as Obama and Clinton Press
On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/200
8/03/03/us/politics/03campaign.html.
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extending the commitments of Reagan and the New Right
Regime.101 Bush's unpopularity, which surely has its roots in
the extended and increasingly unpopular Iraq War, may not
mean that the New Right Regime has run its course. The
regime may be in decline, to be sure, but it is not clear that
voters voted for a full-fledged abandonment of the
conservative principles brought to bear by Ronald Reagan
less than thirty years ago. Obama faces a number of
constraints that may limit his opportunities to be
transformative. For example, the most pressing matter for
Obama is the economic collapse suffered in the United States
and abroad, and it is not clear that his approach to
addressing these economic woes will differ significantly from
the course set by Bush in the Fall of 2008. Obama also
inherited wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the
broader war on terror. And while his approach to conducting
those wars will most certainly differ from his predecessor, his
options for addressing them are not unlimited. In terms of
the Supreme Court, it is the case that his party controls the
Senate, but they do not have the sixty votes it takes to break
a filibuster, and therefore, controversial nominees or those
perceived as extreme might take a lot of political capital. And
of course, Obama himself has expressed an interest in
"changing the way Washington does politics" by pursuing a
bipartisan and consensual approach to policymaking. If
Obama turns out to be more preemptive than reconstructive,
the future of the Court will depend on which issue he
preempts and which issues remain at the core of the
Democratic Party's agenda. We may or may not have our
Something Blue.
101. See generally Stephen Skowronek, Leadership by Definition: First Term
Reflections on George W. Bush's Political Stance, 3 PERSPS. ON POL. 817 (2005).
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